Editorial by Nissen, Morten
To strike an opening chord sufficiently
sonorous, yet intricate, for this rich collec-
tion of Outlines – already the third, and the
first out of two in one year – one must go to
some excess: please forgive us.
Recently, while surfing aimlessly into the
tiny hours of the night on the Internet, the
editor came across the following:
“Over the past several years, several clini-
cians have reported cases of Internet addic-
tion. Until recently, the associated psy-
chopathology has been loosely described in
the literature. Symptoms such as obsessive
thoughts about the Internet, tolerance, di-
minished impulse control, inability to cease
using the Internet, and withdrawal have
been cited as characterizing unhealthy use
of the Internet (Young, 1999). While the term
Internet addiction has been used extensive-
ly, it seems to be somewhat of a misnomer
(Davis, R.A., 1999). Addiction, as used in
the literature, refers to a physiological de-
pendence between a person and some stim-
ulus, usually a substance. For this reason,
the DSM-IV does not use addiction to de-
scribe pathological use or abuse of a sub-
stance or other such stimulus, nor does it
describe compulsive gambling as an addic-
tion. Instead, it favors the terms dependence
(for substances) and pathological (for gam-
bling disorders). Therefore, for the remain-
der of this article, the term pathological
Internet Use (PIU) shall be used to describe
the set of symptoms previously described.
(…) Generalized pathological Internet use
involves a general, multidimensional over-
use of the Internet. It might also include
wasting time online, without a clear objec-
tive. Often, generalized PIU can be associ-
ated with the ‘chat’ found online and depen-
dence on e-mail. This is assumed to be re-
lated to the social aspect of the Internet. The
need for social contact and reinforcement
obtained online results in an increased de-
sire to remain in a virtual social life”
(Davis, 1999a).
The editor’s first impulse was that somehow,
with proper attention, the whole PIU busi-
ness might turn out to be just that market
niche that will rescue the journal commer-
cially. If we could only divert pathological
surfers into our own sites. …now that these
are finally up running1… – Then, shrugging
off such improper and altogether artificial
sentiments, determined to face withdrawal
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head-on, the editor resolved to capitulate to
a Higher Power, leaned back, and collapsed
into a dreamless sleep.
Back in the sobriety of daylight, it
emerged that there might be a secular alter-
native: History. And, in a sense, that is what
this is all about.
———
Our first two papers – both guest lectures at
the University of Copenhagen – aim to de-
velop our understanding of the normal and
the pathological by historical means. Both
Leudar and Rose document genealogical se-
quences that help us see how the way and
the place that fine line is drawn is neither es-
sential nor arbitrary. Together, their range is
from Socrates to near future and from dae-
mon to genome. Thus, we might situate phe-
nomena like PIU in contemporary conflict –
as Leudar urges – and ask if, following
Rose, this could mean that PIU should be
seen as another instance of the tendency that
fundamental ethical presuppositions such as
“conceptions of personhood, of the distinc-
tions between fate and choice, nature and ar-
tificiality (…) are being re-shaped at the mi-
cro-level”, towards blurring the distinction
between “treatment, adjustment, and en-
hancement”; or if, rather, PIU is simply just
another medicalization.
In PIU, it seems, pathology does not de-
pend on exact physical location. Whereas
‘addiction’ seems a desire for the insertion
of a substance into the body, PIU may ex-
press itself in a “desire to remain in a virtu-
al social life”. What kind of a place is that,
anyway?
Besides History, it appears that another
red thread in this issue is the problematiza-
tion of the delimitation of places and fields.
Boundary encounters is a place for learning,
says Kerosuo, and surely, if that is so, the
Outlines is a place for learning.
What is the place of knowledge? The sit-
uating of knowledge in life, as Huniche
traces, seems very different from the situat-
ing of life in knowledge which Rose under-
takes: sometimes in life, ignorance can be
wisdom, even if knowledge of the uncertain
is increasingly certain. “Ignorance is bliss”,
said Cypher, the traitor of the film The
Matrix, preferring to forget that what we
think is life is actually another computer
program: the ultimate PIU.
In The Matrix, as in the underpinnings of
the concept of PIU, situating knowledge in
life (real life!) is still quite different from its
embodiment in technology, the theme which
Sørensen takes up, in order to approach a
case of ‘virtual social life’ that challenges
what we take knowledge to be.
Yet, is ‘life’ so principally different from
‘technology’? Elgaard’s low tech social
work performances seem far from our
Internet starting point, and the pathological
Internet User is far more likely to surf by
some on-line counselling facility than to
show up at the counter of the social centre.
But the case can be argued that all of the pa-
pers in this issue illustrate nicely what
Elgaard allures to as a Chicken-Soup rather
than a Chicken-in-the-Soup model of tech-
nology in social practice.
————
In September 2000, we arranged a confer-
ence with the theme Technology in Social
Practice. Education, Organization, and
Health Care. In the present and following
issues of Outlines a number of the confer-
ence papers are published. The following
considerations are, with a few changes, ex-
cerpted from our introductory statement to
the conference.
Now what makes a journal such as ours
arrange a conference on Technology in So-
cial Practice? The obvious reason is that in
general, technology must be a vital issue in
critical social studies. Yet, it would not be
completely honest to say that our journal has
reflected that on its pages. In fact, taking a
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look at the issues of the Nordiske Udkast
that preceded Outlines, going back through
the years, it isn’t till we reach the first issue
of 1986 that we find an explicit discussion
of technology. From that point onward,
there is no mention of technology in the
titles of the papers and commentaries.
Does this mean that in the past 14 years,
our studies have been social in the sense that
they have overlooked the world of artifacts
and focused exclusively on the relations be-
tween subjects in a community ? Have we,
as Elgaard seems to suggest, fallen down on
one side of what Bruno Latour calls the
great divide between nature and society?
Our contention is that this would be an
unfair characterization. True, notions of so-
cial relations as interaction between subjects
have been present, perhaps most of all in the
beginning of the 70’s when symbolic inter-
actionism was a prominent inspiration in
Copenhagen social psychology, and perhaps
also again with the rise of social construc-
tionism in the 90’s.
But as a general paradigm, human inter-
action has mostly been seen as mediated.
Thus, one will find, if one looks closely, ar-
tifacts of many kinds present as a kind of
vanishing moment in the varied research
projects and theoretical considerations in
Nordiske Udkast.
This very broad approach to technology
as the various artifacts that mediate human
social practice gives, probably, a valuable
contribution to our understanding of tech-
nologies. Thus, for instance, such a broad
approach to technology opens our eyes for
understanding such things as technologies
of the self, technologies of knowledge, or to
view discourses and methods in social work
or psychotherapy as technologies, that is, as
artifacts that objectify and mediate activity
and social relations.
However, it could still be argued that al-
lowing for a mediation of social relations is
not quite the same as a real interest in tech-
nology. One could say that the bare concept
of mediating object needs to be unfolded
and differentiated for it to become technolo-
gy proper. First, the category of object needs
to be supplemented with a category of in-
strument, or means, so that in the framework
of human activity at least we have a relation
between instrument and object. Secondly,
the idea of instrument implies a notion of
causality, as the ends-means relation is ex-
ternalized in the form of the object. Thirdly,
this idea of external causality can be devel-
oped and repeated almost indefinitely so
that we end up having systems of multiple
causalities, or machines.
This way, it appears, we approach a con-
cept of technology that makes it understand-
able how it may appear as entirely au-
tonomous, or perhaps we might say auto-
matic, and separated from human affairs. It
is only when we take into consideration
technology in this more expanded, or un-
folded, sense of the concept, that it begins to
make sense to regard the subjects involved
as merely some, few, out of several elements
in what seems to be endless chains and net-
works of causations.
Still, it also makes sense for a critical
journal to arrange a conference that takes
precisely the idea of the autonomy of tech-
nology under just as critical a scrutiny as the
idea of a free-floating and non-material in-
tersubjectivity. It remains a technology in
social practice.
As such, technologies are invented, intro-
duced, implemented, learned, developed,
negotiated, assessed, appraised, and all the
other things that we shall learn about in the
ensuing two issues, all of which somehow
presupposes that they are part of social prac-
tices. That is, they are neither neutral, unim-
portant instruments for pre-given human
purposes, nor do they seem to be unequivo-
cally predetermining human affairs.
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If this is so, technology in social practice
must be a rich and continuously surprising
field of interest for critical social studies,
and it is high time we begin drawing the
Outlines of this field. It is still far too early
to worry about any pathological technology
dependence.
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